Iran has pledged to retaliate against the airstrike on its consulate in Damascus on Monday, but what options does Iran have to harm Israel, and how might it choose to retaliate?
The attack resulted in the deaths of thirteen individuals, including Brigadier General Mohammad Reza Zahedi, a significant figure in the Quds Force, the overseas branch of Iran's elite Republican Guards. Israel has not confirmed its involvement in the attack.
Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian was quoted as saying on his ministry's website that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu had "completely lost his mental balance."
The escalation was intended to demonstrate that Iran was a "paper tiger," according to Fawaz Gerges, a professor of International Relations at the London School of Economics.
It also represented a notable setback for the Quds Force, which plays a crucial role in coordinating arms and technology transfers to Hezbollah in Lebanon and Syria.
Hamas's military wing, the Qassam Brigades, stated that Brigadier General Zahedi played a "prominent role" in the October 7 Hamas attacks on southern Israel, which sparked the ongoing war in Gaza. Iran denies direct involvement in the attack but supports Hamas with funding, weapons, and training.
However, experts suggest that Iran's options for retaliating for the Damascus strike may be limited.
Ali Sadrzadeh, an author and analyst of Middle East affairs, noted that "Iran is not capable of a big confrontation with Israel given its military capabilities and economic and political situation." Nonetheless, Iran may feel compelled to respond for domestic reasons and to maintain its reputation among regional allies.
Gerges also indicated that Iran is unlikely to retaliate directly against Israel, opting instead for "strategic patience" to pursue its goal of acquiring a nuclear weapon.
He emphasized that Iran seeks to establish strategic deterrence, not just against Israel but also against the United States.
Since Israel's involvement in Gaza, attacks by Iran-backed militias in Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, and Yemen against Israeli interests have increased.
However, these actions have stopped short of provoking a full-scale war.
Hezbollah, an Iran-backed Lebanese group, possesses a substantial arsenal of rockets and missiles. While it has the capability to escalate tensions, experts believe Hezbollah is unlikely to engage in a major confrontation with Israel.
Sadrzadeh suggested that Iran might opt for symbolic retaliation rather than risking direct conflict with Israel. He cited Iran's missile attack on an Iraqi air base housing US troops following the assassination of Qasem Soleimani as an example of symbolic action.
Despite the promise of "severe revenge," no US military personnel were killed in the missile attack, leading some to believe that the US military had been warned in advance.
Yousof Azizi of Virginia Tech's School of Public & International Affairs suggested that there may be internal debates in Iran between those advocating for nuclear deterrence and those advocating for direct attacks on Israel.
However, the policy of "strategic patience" is likely to prevail.
Other experts suggest that Iran may use cyberspace to retaliate against Israel, such as through cyber-attacks on information technology or operational technology.
In conclusion, Iran's options for retaliating against Israel for the Damascus airstrike are limited, and it may choose symbolic actions or cyber warfare rather than direct confrontation.