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In recent news, a senior Ukrainian officer has emphasized a stark reality: the imminent delivery of F-16 fighter jets from the West will hold little significance if Ukraine is overtaken and its guns fall silent.
Many are left questioning how this could be the case. Artillery shells are not prohibitively expensive items. Ukraine requires only around 10,000 shells daily to push back the invaders.
The issue with shells is not financial; it is the lack of production capacity.
Despite being home to the world's largest military-industrial complex, the United States can produce only 28,000 rounds of 155mm shells per month—less than 10% of Ukraine's requirements—even with its factories running non-stop.
Most of the millions of shells Ukraine has already fired have been from existing stockpiles, not newly manufactured ones.
These stockpiles have not solely been American; nations worldwide, though often preferring to remain unnamed while accepting Western money, have sent their stocks of 155mm shells to Ukraine.
However, these reserves will eventually be depleted.
So why are new factories not being constructed? The simple answer is that they are.
This situation was acknowledged back in 2022. The U.S. has been building new factories since then, and they are expected to become operational later this year.
The U.S. will soon produce 70,000-80,000 shells per month. Other nations are also ramping up production, albeit not as rapidly as the U.S., and their output will not be available as soon.
But it may not be practical for the West to establish a massive shell production industry capable of sustaining Ukraine's military operations indefinitely.
Assuming no changes occur, Ukraine will exhaust its manpower in the near future.
At that point, sadly, attention would need to be redirected towards our own defense.
However, as the head of the RAF recently stated, "We do not want to fight this type of war." Indeed, when fighting alongside the U.S., our tactics differ.
In 2003, Saddam Hussein's large Soviet-equipped tank army was defeated with minimal British losses; our artillery only fired 9,000 155mm shells throughout the entire campaign.
In one way or another, shortly after the conflict in Ukraine ends, the Russian army, even if severely weakened, will recover and rearm.
It will be significantly larger than in 2022, supported by Vladimir Putin's new Russian war economy and battle-hardened troops.
On the surface, Putin would still be irrational to attack NATO. Even if the U.S. withdraws from the alliance, the Russian economy is still smaller than Italy's alone.
Russia should never be able to match the military might of the non-U.S. NATO nations.
Nevertheless, Russian military spending is increasing to 6% of GDP, compared to Italy's 1.7%. Russia is already approximately three times as powerful as Italy.
As Napoleon famously said, "the moral is to the physical as three to one." Determination is even more crucial than numbers.
The West could have easily provided Ukraine with the weapons to reclaim Crimea from the Russians, but we haven't, due to a lack of determination.
Would Putin truly believe he would face serious resistance if he moved into the Suwalki Gap and isolated the Baltics for reconquest?
There is much discussion in the UK about the need to increase defense spending, perhaps to 2.5% or even 3% of GDP. During the Cold War, it was 4% to 5%.
The debate should be framed in those terms, not just in the UK but throughout Europe. Even in Estonia, on the doorstep of Russia, defense spending will only reach 3% this year.
In Western Europe's democracies, we are, to be frank, so reliant on our bloated welfare states that we can only spare pennies for defense.
The Office for Budget Responsibility predicts that in 2023-24, Britain will spend just £32 billion on defense (other figures exist, but the UK is known for creative accounting regarding its defense spending claims). In total, the government will spend an almost unbelievable £1,189 billion.
No one dares suggest a modest 3% reduction in other departments so we can double our defense budget.
Yet surely, it would be better for all pensioners, disabled, unemployed, and sick people to have 97% of what they have now, provided by their own government, than to face ruin, destruction, and subjugation as citizens of a newly conquered hostile power.
If you're thinking "that might happen in Estonia, but not here," think again. When dictators conquer continental Europe, they always start looking at us.
Even if we somehow come to our senses and double our defense budget, our welfare mindset and stagnant economy would still cripple us.
Instead of simply purchasing ships, we would continue trying to revive long-dead British shipyards as social regeneration projects (Harland & Wolff).
Instead of merely buying fighters and missiles, we would pour money into doomed job creation schemes intended to replicate U.S. technology (GCAP).
Instead of just acquiring drones and armored vehicles, we would insist on well-paid jobs for ourselves, thereby ruining successful designs (Watchkeeper, Ajax).
As the 155mm shell situation demonstrates, it's too late to prepare once the war has begun. We need to develop determination and stop assuming that it's the government's responsibility to provide welfare and well-paid jobs.